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COMMENTS
THE EAJA AND THE NLRB: CHILLING THE
GENERAL COUNSEL'S PREROGATIVE
TO ISSUE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE COMPLAINTS?
In 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)' that
provides for the award of attorney's fees to a party prevailing in litigation in
an action brought by the federal government.' Unless the government can
prove that its position was "substantially justified" or that "special circum-
stances" would render the award unjust, the prevailing party is awarded the
fees.3 The EAJA was enacted in order to ensure that certain parties, partic-
ularly individuals and small businesses, are not coerced into complying with
government action simply because of the litigation expenses involved.4 Con-
gress contemplated that the award of attorney's fees would encourage indi-
viduals to challenge potentially unreasonable or arbitrary government action
and deter similar government behavior in the future.5
The EAJA is of particular concern to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), which has been a party to more than half of the administrative
proceedings involving the EAJA.6 In an NLRB proceeding under the
EAJA, a party must first prevail on the merits of an unfair labor practice
1. Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat. 2325, 2325-30 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 504 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982), as amended by Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub.
L. No. 99-80, 54 U.S.L.W. 1 (U.S. Sept. 10, 1985)) [hereinafter EAJA]. EAJA authorizes
attorney's fees and awards in both judicial proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982), and
in administrative actions, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982). The EAJA was enacted with a three year
"sunset" clause which repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) as of Oct. 1, 1984. Pub. L. No. 96-481,
§ 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325, 2329 (1980). Notwithstanding a veto by President Reagan, the Act
was reenacted into permanent law in 1984. See Equal Access Reauthorization Pocket Vetoed
By President, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2964 (1984) (reprinting the President's memoran-
dum of disapproval).
2. The term attorney's fees also includes litigation expenses such as witness fees, expert
witness fees and other'expenses incurred in litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1982).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982).
4. Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(a), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980). See H.R. RF.i,. No. 1418, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4988.
5. Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(a), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
6. NLRB General Counsel on Equal Access to Justice Act-The First Year, Memorandum
GC 83-11, reprinted in 1983 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK (BNA) 222-26 [hereinafter Mem-
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case and, within thirty days of the final order, submit a fee application to the
Board.7 The General Counsel must then demonstrate to the Board or an
administrative law judge that her position was substantially justified in order
to avoid the award of attorney's fees.'
This Comment will examine the traditional role of the General Counsel of
the NLRB to issue unfair labor practice complaints with unreviewable dis-
cretion and the history of the EAJA. It will explore the meanings of the
terms "position of government" and substantially justified under the EAJA.
In examining the "position of the agency" requirement, this Comment will
propose that the initial issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint may be
beyond the scope of EAJA proceedings. Nevertheless, the EAJA require-
ment of substantially justified will be compared to the NLRB standards for
issuing a complaint. Further, this Comment will suggest that the EAJA has
the potential for "chilling" the traditional independence of the General
Counsel in issuing complaints. While recent case law involving EAJA
claims before the NLRB will demonstrate that these fears are unfounded to
date, the new 1985 amendments to the EAJA could realize the chilling of the
issuance of unfair labor practice complaints.
I. THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S PREROGATIVE TO ISSUE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE COMPLAINTS
A. The History of the General Counsel's Independence from the Board
In 1947, the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) was passed, of-
fering significant changes and additions to the 1935 National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA).9 One of the most debated revisions of the NLRA was
the creation of an independent General Counsel, endowed with the power to
investigate, review and issue unfair labor practice complaints. Prior to the
Act's revision, the NLRB possessed the investigatory power in addition to
its power to adjudicate cases. Critics of the NLRA maintained that the orig-
inal system caused the Board to solicit litigation for the purposes of harass-
orandum GC 83-11]. See also Lieberwitz, Attorneys'Fees, The NLRB, and The Equal Access to
Justice Act: From Bad to Worse, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 2 (1984).
7. The application must allege that the applicant and its subsidiaries had an aggregate
net worth of no more than seven million dollars and no more than 500 employees at the time
the complaint was issued. The complaint must also allege that the General Counsel's position
was not substantially justified. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(l)(B) (1982) (as amended by Act of Aug. 5,
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 54 U.S.L.W. I (U.S., Sept. 10, 1985)). See Peterson, The NLRB and
Equal Access to Justice: A Promise Unfulfilled?, 34 LAB. L.J. 266, 267 (1983).
8. Peterson, supra note 7, at 267.
9. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136,
amended the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
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ing management or establishing a point of law.' ° The LMRA changed this
practice by creating the General Counsel, a "new official to exercise various
prosecuting and investigative functions under the National Labor Relations
Act, to be entirely independent of the Board."" The 1947 amendments es-
tablished that the General Counsel would have "the final authority to act in
the name of, but independently of, any direction, control, or review by the
Board in respect of the investigation of the charges and issuance of com-
plaints of unfair labor practices."' 2 Consequently, the General Counsel was
given the independence to issue complaints unaffected by the Board's opin-
ions or political dispositions. 3 The LMRA further enhanced this indepen-
dence by stating that the General Counsel was to be appointed by the
President, rather than chosen by the Board."4
Although the General Counsel's independence was subject to much de-
10. H.R. REP. No. 3109, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 44-48 (1940). See also C. MORRIS,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 33 (2d ed. 1983).
11. H.R. REP. No. 245, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1940), reprinted in I NLRB LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 296 (1985) [hereinafter I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Mr. Owens. I believe that one of the most important portions of this bill is the
division of powers: that is, the division of the functions, the investigation, the prose-
cution, the complaints, and the judicial end. The gentleman mentioned that the gen-
eral counsel would be absolutely independent .... It is my understanding that the
conference is saying to the House at this time that ... [in different] sections, where
they mention the Board, [they mean] that it is the general counsel who shall have the
power to proceed with the investigation, with the complaint, and shall have complete
power over the attorney's who are prosecuting; that the Board shall not control [her]
or have the right of review in any way. Is that correct?
Mr. Hartley. The gentleman's opinion is absolutely correct ... [the General Coun-
sel] acts on behalf of the Board but completely independent of the Board.
Id. at 883.
12. Prior to 1947, the regional directors were required to obtain the consent of the Board
before issuing a complaint. Clearly, this practice gave the Board enormous influence over the
cases which they wished to hear. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY 38-39 (1950). With the creation of the General Counsel, the regional direc-
tors became part of the General Counsel, and thus, independent of the Board.
13. Critics of the LMRA asserted that the Board's issuance of a complaint in several cases
indicated bias. For example, in Berkshire Knitting Mills, 17 N.L.R.B. 239 (1939), the Board
had ordered an investigation of violations before charges were filed by the union. See H.R.
REP. No. 3109, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 47-49 (1940).
14. Opponents of the 1947 bill argued that the system could result in
[a] labor Czar ... [a] single individual [who] will exercise not only complete power
over all the Board's legal work ... but over most of its administrative work as well.
One person will determine when complaints shall issue in all cases, how investigation
shall be conducted, how cases shall be tried, which cases shall be enforced. Much of
this action will not be subject to appeal, either to the Board or the courts. Any
discipline of this individual is precluded by making [her] a Presidential appointee,
subject to Senate confirmation, removable only for clear malfeasance in office.
93 CONG. RiC. 6671 (1947), reprinted in 11 NLRB LEGISI.ATivi: HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
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bate during the passage of the LMRA and in subsequent years,' 5 the Gen-
eral Counsel's unreviewable discretion to issue a complaint independently of
the Board has since been clearly established. In Vaca v. Sipes, 16 the United
States Supreme Court held that "the Board's General Counsel has unreview-
able discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint."' 17
The Court's statement in the Vaca decision indicates that the General Coun-
sel's independence in issuing unfair labor practice complaints extends to the
courts as well as to the Board. 8 Thus, traditionally the General Counsel
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1567 (1985) (remarks of Sen. Murray, June 6, 1947)
[hereinafter II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
15. When President Truman vetoed the LMRA, he noted that the General Counsel was
given broad discretion to issue complaints and that this power was too broad. Truman worried
that the General Counsel's power would result in policymaking by deciding which cases the
Board would hear. See Veto Message of President Truman (June 20, 1947), reprinted in 93
CONG. REC. 7485, 7486 (1947). Soon after the LMRA was passed, Congress reconsidered the
independent status of the General Counsel. See, e.g., S. 249, §§ 101-103, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949), reprinted in S. REP. No. 99, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 73-79 (1949) (proposal to end
the General Counsel's independent status); Reorganization Plan No. 12 of 1950, reprinted in S.
REP. No. 1516, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1950) (plan to abolish the Office of General Counsel
and transfer its functions to the Board). For a fuller discussion of these plans, see Rosenblum,
A New Look at the General Counsel's Unreviewable Discretion Not to Issue a Complaint Under
the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349, 1357-58 (1977).
Most recently the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation denounced NLRB
General Counsel Rosemary Collyer for her "decision to dismiss unfair labor practice charges"
challenging an agreement between General Motors and the United Auto Workers. As a result,
"the Right To Work group unveil[ed] draft legislation to end the unreviewable discretion of
the Board's General Counsel to dismiss unfair labor practice charges. Under the legislation,
the [General Counsel's] decisions not to issue complaints would be appealable to the Board,
whose rulings could be taken to the federal appeals court like any other NLRB orders." Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 108, at 1-2 (June 5, 1986).
16. 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). See also United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366
F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
17. 386 U.S. at 182.
18. See Bays v. Miller, 524 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1975); Hernandez v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 119
(5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 916 (1973); Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972); Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968); Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 295 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1961); Ban-
dlow v. Rothman, 278 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960);
General Drivers Local 886 v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1950); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170
F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1948) (per curiam). Thus, a decision of the General Counsel not to issue an
unfair labor practice complaint is not subject to review under § 10(f). Cf Southern Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers Local 1184 v. Ordman, 318 F. Supp. 633 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (reversing the
General Counsel's refusal to investigate a complaint based on an erroneous interpretation of
the statute).
In addition, such decisions are not subject to judicial review under § 701 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982); see also George Banta Co. v. NLRB, 626
F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Seafarer's v. NLRB, 88 L.R.R.M.
26, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Kolinske v. Automobile Workers, 530 F. Supp. 728
(D.C. 1982). It is well established that both the Board and the courts are free to dismiss a
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could decline to issue a complaint without fear of judicial review.
Because a decision made by the General Counsel is unreviewable, a charg-
ing party has no other judicial or administrative avenues for relief. 9 There-
fore, the duty of the General Counsel to issue unfair labor practice
complaints is vital to the public enforcement of the NLRA. For this reason,
the independent nature of the General Counsel's decisions has been viewed
as a desirable and important aspect of the NLRB.2" The enactment of the
EAJA threatens to interfere with the General Counsel's established indepen-
dence, as it requires both the Board and the courts to determine whether the
General Counsel was substantially justified in the issuance of an unfair labor
practice complaint.2 ' The EAJA requirement of substantial justification
conflicts with the General Counsel's traditional requirement of reasonable
cause to issue an unfair labor practice complaint.22
B. The Standard and Procedure Required for the General Counsel to
Issue an Unfair Labor Practice Complaint
The General Counsel's decision of whether to issue a complaint is essen-
tially based upon a reasonableness determination. The NLRA, the LMRA,
and the legislative history of the LMRA all provide guidelines for the Gen-
eral Counsel to follow in issuing a complaint. 23 The reasonable cause stan-
dard, identified in the legislative history of the LMRA,24 instructs the
General Counsel to issue a complaint if there is reasonable cause to believe
that an unfair labor practice charge is true.25 Additionally, the legislative
complaint once it has been issued. See also Morris, supra note 10. See generally Note, Heckler
v. Chaney: The New Presumption of Nonreviewability of Agency Enforcement Decisions, 35
CATH. U.L. REV. 1099 (1986).
19. Several commentators assert that the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion al-
lows excessive power to vest in one individual. See Rosenblum, supra note 15; McClintock,
The Unreviewable Power of the General Counsel-Partial Enforcement of The Labor Act, 12
GONZ. L. REV. 79 (1976); Gabriel, The Role of the NLRB General Counsel, 26 LAB. L.J. 79
(1975). See also 93 CONG. REC. 6655, 6671 (1947), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 14, at 1567, 1588 (remarks of Sen. Murray and Sen. Pepper criticizing the role of
the General Counsel).
20. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
21. The EAJA amendments appear to suggest that the issuance of a complaint is in fact a
"position of government" that may be subject to attack. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 11-12, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 140-41. But see
infra note 52 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 23-31.
23. See infra notes 24-31. The NLRA forbids the issuance of a complaint based upon an
unfair labor practice that has occurred more than six months prior to the filing of charges with
the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
24. H.R. REP. No. 245, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. 35 (1940), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 11, at 331.
25. Id.
1986]
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history indicates that the General Counsel is required to issue a complaint
when the matter is "borderline." Therefore, the General Counsel may exer-
cise "discretion" not to issue a complaint only when the facts alleged by the
complainant do not constitute an unfair labor practice, or when the com-
plainant clearly cannot prove his claim.16 When in doubt, the General
Counsel should issue a complaint.
The Office of the General Counsel has also promulgated guidelines to de-
termine the merits of unfair labor practice charges in its Case Handling
Manual.27 After a charge is filed at the regional level, the Regional Office
investigates the charge to "ascertain, analyze, and apply the relevant facts in
order to arrive at the proper disposition of the case." 2 The Regional Office
must consider "relevant facts," "[l]egal analysis of available factual materi-
als," and "[r]esolutions of conflicts"29 in determining whether the charge has
merit. Most importantly, the Case Handling Manual also provides that "[iun
the infrequent case in which (I) applying all relevant principles, the Region
is unable to resolve credibility, and (2) the resolution of one conflict means
the difference between dismissal and issuance of complaint, a complaint
should be issued."3 However, the resolution of credibility issues by the Re-
gion is, in practice, the exception rather than the rule.3 Whenever doubt
exists, the Regional Office, utilizing its discretion, usually will issue a
complaint.
The reasonable cause standard is appropriate in the context of NLRB pro-
ceedings where, if a complaint is not issued, the charging party will have no
other avenue of relief. Therefore, it is better to issue a complaint, which may
or may not be dismissed, rather than refuse to issue a complaint that may
only possibly possess merit. The issuance of a complaint does not determine
whether an unfair labor practice in fact has occurred. Rather, it simply indi-
cates that an unfair labor practice is alleged to have occurred. The com-
plaint is simply a starting point from which an administrative law judge may
resolve credibility and legal issues and then determine if the alleged violation
of the NLRA has indeed occurred.
26. Id.
27. NLRB Case Handling Man. (CCH) 100-160 (1983).
28. Id. at 501.
29. Id. The Regional Office is expected to resolve factual conflicts by reinterviewing par-
ties and having other Board agents reinterview the parties. Id. at 600.
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
31. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 273 (citing Midwestern Builders, Inc., No. 8-CA-14351-
(E) (May 26, 1982). In Midwestern Builders, the administrative law judge stated that "[it is
not the function of the General Counsel to resolve such [credibility] issues in the absence of a
hearing." But cf Rosenblum, supra note 15, at 1361 (regional offices sometimes ignore evi-
dence and refuse to issue a complaint).
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The standards provided in the legislative history and Case Handling Man-
ual come into direct conflict with the standard required by the EAJA. The
EAJA requires that the General Counsel be substantially justified in the de-
cision to issue an unfair labor practice complaint.32 If conflicts of credibility
and doubtful legal issues exist, the issuance of a complaint is reasonable for
the explanations stated above, although it may not be substantially justified.
Conflicts may potentially arise as the Office of the General Counsel follows
traditional standards for issuing a complaint while EAJA claims require re-
viewing the action under a higher standard. Thus, the standards imposed by
the EAJA threaten the traditional independent role of the General Counsel
with the increased possibility of large lawsuits against the NLRB.
II. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
Traditionally, the United States Government has been protected against
suits by private citizens by the doctrine of sovereign immunity,33 and the
American Rule, which prohibits fee shifting.34 The EAJA reduced these
protections significantly by codifying common law exceptions and making
the federal government liable for attorney's fees in certain administrative
proceedings and civil actions.35 The EAJA provides that courts may award
attorney's fees and expenses "to the prevailing party in any civil action
brought by or against the United States."36 Unless the agency can prove
that its position was substantially justified, or that "special circumstances
make an award unjust,",3 7 the statute requires that attorney's fees be
awarded to the prevailing party.
The purpose of the EAJA is to ensure that certain individuals, partner-
ships, corporations, business associations, or other organizations will not be
deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable govern-
ment action due to the litigation expense involved.38 Accordingly, the
32. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
33. For a more complete discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see Note, Will
the Sun Rise Again for the Equal Access to Justice Act?, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 265 (1982).
34. The American Rule prohibits the award of attorney's fees to the winning litigant in
federal litigation in the absence of statutory authorization. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975). See generally Derfner, The True "American
Rule": Drafting Fee Legislation in the Public Interest, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 251 (1979);
Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 717 (1976).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982). See Note, The Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 307, 310 (1982).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
38. EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat. 2325, 2325-30 (1980) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 504 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982), as amended by Act of Aug. 5, 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-80, 54 U.S.L.W. 1 (1985)). H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10,
19861
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EAJA is a statute designed to come to the financial rescue of parties who
could not otherwise afford to challenge government actions. 39
Any party seeking attorney's fees under the EAJA must first satisfy its
preliminary jurisdiction requirements of size' and worth.41 Once the juris-
diction requirements are met, the party seeking the award must prove that it
"prevailed" in the litigation. Most courts have defined "prevailed" to mean
"success on any significant issue in litigation."42 However, each agency is
permitted to establish its own rules under the EAJA, and therefore the ex-
tent to which awards will be made in different agency cases may vary
slightly.43 Assuming jurisdictional requirements have been met and the
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4988 (attorney's fees should be
awarded to "those individuals for whom cost may be a deterrent to vindicating their rights").
39. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4988. Another basis for the EAJA has been the theory that "a party
who chooses to litigate an issue against the Government is not only representing his or her own
vested interest but is also refining and formulating public policy." Id. But see Lieberwitz,
supra note 6, at 37 (noting that "[tihis general statement is surprising, in light of the historic
use of this private attorney general theory only in connection with isolated statutes represent-
ing important public policy").
40. An unincorporated business, association, or organization must have less than 500 em-
ployees. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(l)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
41. The party's net worth must be less than $2,000,000 if the party is an individual, or less
than $7,000,000 if the party is a business. Id. In the 1985 amendments, the net worth limit
was raised from $1,000,000 to $2,000,000 for individuals and from $5,000,000 to $7,000,000
for organizations, partnerships associations and local units of government. Compare id. with 5
U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (1982). Even prior to this change, however, several commentators
viewed the financial criteria as being too broad and feared that the Bill would render awards to
parties it was not meant to encompass. See Award of Attorneys' Fees Against The Federal
Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Ad-
ministration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77, (1980)
(statement of Mary Frances Derfner); id. at 86 (statement of Nan Aron) [hereinafter Hearings
on S.265]. In addition, disputes have arisen as to the computation of net worth. See, e.g., Noel
Produce, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 769 (1984); Pacific Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 271
N.L.R.B. 1165 (1984); Stucco Stone Prods., Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1984); W.C. McQuaide,
Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1984). See also Kut-Kwik Corp., 273 N.L.R.B. 838 (1984) (failure to
include net worth resulted in dismissal of award request); Carpenters Local 1361, 272
N.L.R.B. 1118 (1984) (applicant must submit finances before award will be considered);
United Union of Roofers, 269 N.L.R.B. 1067 (1984) (union failed to show it was a tax exempt
organization and, therefore, below the net worth requirement).
42. See Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978). Almost every circuit
has recognized this definition. See, e.g., Ramos v. Koebig, 638 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1981); Chi-
cano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d
336 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1979);
Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 961 (1982); Northcross
v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Sethy v. Alameda
County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); Kim-
brough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1982). The NLRB has established that when a party in an ad-
versary proceeding prevails only in part, only fees and expenses incurred in connection with a
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party has in fact prevailed, the fees will be awarded unless the administrative
agency can refute the claim by proving that its position was justified.44
The EAJA places the burden of proof in these proceedings on the admin-
istrative agency to demonstrate that its position was substantially justified or
that "special circumstances make an award unjust."45 The exact meaning of
this burden of proof has spawned extensive litigation. 46 In order to under-
stand the burden that the government must carry, an analysis of the meaning
of both the terms, "position of the government" and "substantially justified"
is required.47 Interpretation of these terms has played an integral role in
EAJA-NLRB proceedings.
A. "Position" of the Government or Agency
In the 1985 amendments to the EAJA, Congress attempted to clarify the
meaning of the phrase "position of government.",4  While several courts had
interpreted the "position of the government" to include only the government
or agency actions during litigation and not the underlying proceeding,49 the
1985 amendments clearly rejected this view.5° Congress explained that
significant and discrete portion of that proceeding are recoverable. 29 C.F.R. § 102.144(a)
(1986). See Temp Tech Indus. v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1985) (employer that pre-
vailed on only one of three unfair labor practice charges was denied attorney's fees); Kitchen
Fresh, Inc. v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 1513 (6th Cir. 1984) (employer that had been successful on
appeal from an NLRB order in establishing its right to a hearing was not a "prevailing party");
Carthage Heating & Sheet Metal Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 120 (1984) (employer was not a prevailing
party where dispute was settled).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982).
45. Id.
46. See H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 138-39.
47. For interpretations of these two terms prior to the 1985 amendments, see Note, supra
note 34; Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1089,
1101-11 (1984).
48. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 140-41.
49. See, e.g., Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F. Supp. 225, 228 (D.
Md. 1981) ("position of the United States" refers to its position in prosecuting or defending
litigation rather than its action upon which the suit is based). See also Boudin v. Thomas, 732
F.2d 1107 (2d Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Tyler Business Servs. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1982); Grand Boulevard Im-
provement Ass'n v. Chicago, 553 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. I11. 1982); Operating Eng'rs Local
Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 737 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1984).
50. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt 1, at 12, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 140. "In clarifying the 'position' term, the Committee expressly
rejects the holding of the District of Columbia Circuit in Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 557
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984), that the only government 'position' to be
scrutinized in the context of an EAJA case is that taken in the litigation itself." Id. Accord
Iowa Express Distribution Inc. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
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"[t]he Committee's clarification of the 'position' term is intended to broaden
the court's or agency's focus of inquiry for EAJA purposes beyond mere
litigation arguments, and to require an assessment of those government ac-
tions that formed the basis of the litigation."'" However, Congress also
modified this statement by suggesting that government or agency actions or
failures to act subject to EAJA do not include preliminary or procedural
decisions of the agency or government that would not be subject to judicial
review.5 2 The characterization of the agency action as a "procedural deci-
sion" or the "basis of litigation" is of paramount importance, for EAJA lia-
bility attaches only to a "position" of the government or agency. Assuming,
however, that the action or decision qualified as the "position of the govern-
ment," the agency must then prove it was substantially justified.
B. The Substantially Justified Standard
Originally, the legislative history of the EAJA defined the test of whether
a government action is substantially justified as essentially "one of reasona-
bleness.",5 3 The original House report stated that "[w]here the Government
can show that its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award
will be made."5 4 To explain this standard, the House report further noted
that "[t]he standard and the burden of proof adopted . . . represents an ac-
ceptable middle ground between an automatic award of fees and the restric-
tive standard" of requiring a showing of arbitrary and frivolous action.55
However, the 1985 amendments emphasized that the standard of substan-
Ct. 595 (1984); Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984); Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1983); Lonning v. Schweiker, 568 F. Supp.
1079 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Watkins v. Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Community
Health Servs., Inc. v. Califano, 563 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 554 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 722 F.2d 1081
(2d Cir. 1983); MacDonald v. Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 536 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Cornelia v.
Schweiker, 553 F. Supp. 240 (D.S.D. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.
1984); Moholland v. Schweiker, 546 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.H. 1982); Citizens Coalition for Block
Grant Compliance, Inc. v. Euclid, 537 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd on other grounds,
717 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1983).
51. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 12, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141.
52. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141.
53. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4989.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4993. The Justice
Department opposed the bill and submitted its own proposal in which fees would be awarded
only if the government's position was found to be "arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable or
groundless." See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4993. But see Note, Reenacting the Equal Access to Justice Act. A
Proposal for Automatic Attorney's Fee Awards, 94 Yale L.J. 1207 (1985).
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tial justification is stricter than reasonableness.5 6 The fact that in 1980 Con-
gress rejected a standard of reasonably justified in favor of substantially
justified indicates that the test must require more than mere reasonable-
ness.57 Curiously, the 1985 Committee conditioned the more restrictive
standard by recognizing that the full panoply of factual and legal questions
arising from various government disputes will necessitate a case-by-case ba-
sis determination of what is substantially justified.5" In addition, statements
found in the early legislative history indicate that more than one legitimate
rationale may be available to the government or agency despite its failure to
win a case.5 9
Although the legislative history of the EAJA demonstrates that substan-
tially justified implies a standard more stringent than reasonable, the exact
meaning of the term remains undefined. However, the 1985 amendments
state that the EAJA standard conflicts with the NLRB's reasonableness
standard for the issuance of a complaint. It is this conflict that may chill the
General Counsel's independence to issue an unfair labor practice complaint.
III. THE EAJA AND THE NLRB: THE BIG CHILL?
Since the statute's enactment in 1980 and until 1983,60 the NLRB was the
subject of over half of the EAJA proceedings. It appears that this trend
continues to date.61 Thus, the various standards of the EAJA are important
when placed in the context of NLRB proceedings. First, if the EAJA is used
to attack any underlying position of the agency, the traditional independence
of the General Counsel to issue complaints becomes subject to scrutiny and
56. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 9, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 138. See also Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1984); Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Ulrich v.
Schweiker, 548 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D. Idaho 1982); Nunes-Correia v. Haig, 543 F. Supp. 812, 817
(D.D.C. 1982); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D. Idaho 1982).
57. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt 1, at 9, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 138.
58. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 138.
59. "The standard, however, should not be read to raise a presumption that the Govern-
ment position was not substantially justified, simply because it lost the case." H.R. REP. No.
1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4990.
Critics of the substantially justified standard insist that such a presumption does exist. "Once
the prevailing party satisfies this burden of going forward, the fee must be awarded unless the
government fulfills its burden of persuasion." See Lieberwitz, supra note 6, at 45.
60. Memorandum: GC 83-11, supra note 6, at 222 n.1.
61. At least 46 cases have been tried against the NLRB General Counsel between 1984
and 1986. See, e.g., Tajon, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 13, 1986); Forest Grove Lumber
Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Dec. 31, 1985); East Tenn. Packing Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 168
(Dec. 31, 1985); Bronaugh Motor Express, 277 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (Dec. 31, 1985); Adams &
Westlake, Ltd., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Dec. 19, 1985).
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the agency may become liable for attorney's fees. Second, the EAJA's re-
quirement of substantial justification places a higher burden on the General
Counsel to justify the issuance of a complaint than the reasonable cause stan-
dard required by the Board. Third, the review by the Board and courts may
pressure the General Counsel to conform to standards she otherwise could
ignore. These elements of the EAJA may "chill" the traditional freedom
and independence of the General Counsel to issue a complaint, and as a
result, impede the enforcement of the NLRA.
A. Position of the Agency: Is Issuance of a Complaint
Subject to EAJA Proceedings?
In an NLRB proceeding, several levels of action exist. First, after a
charge is filed, the Regional Director will follow the standards set forth in
the LMRA and the Case Handling Manual to determine whether the charge
merits the issuance of a complaint.62 If a complaint is issued, the General
Counsel takes on the role of prosecutor in the proceeding before an adminis-
trative law judge.6 3 Clearly, if the General Counsel acts in an improper or
arbitrary manner at the administrative hearing, a respondent would have a
cause of action against the General Counsel for attorney's fees. However, it
is unclear from the EAJA whether the underlying issuance of a complaint
would also be subject to EAJA claims.
As mentioned above, the 1985 amendments to the EAJA clarify the term
"position of government" to include government actions that formed the
basis of the litigation.64 In NLRB proceedings, the issuance of a complaint
is the starting point for any litigation. The complaint sets forth the alleged
violation of the NLRA and serves as notice of the agency proceedings
against the party. Hence, it is logical to assume that, under the 1985 clarifi-
cations, the issuance of a complaint would be subject to EAJA attacks.
The 1985 legislative history, however, notes that "preliminary or proce-
dural decisions of the agency which would not be subject to judicial review"
are not actions upon which EAJA claims may be made.65 Traditionally, the
decision of the General Counsel to issue a complaint is beyond judicial re-
view." Therefore, it would appear that the issuance of a complaint, as a
procedural decision, would be immune to EAJA attacks. A potential con-
tradiction arises in the legislative history of the 1985 amendments. In prac-
62. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
63. See Morris, supra note 10, at 822.
64. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
65. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 13, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141.
66. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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tice, however, most of the EAJA cases that came before the NLRB between
1980 and 1985 challenged the initial issuance of a complaint.67 Neverthe-
less, the 1985 amendments may carve out an "exception" for preliminary or
procedural decisions 68 and provide a new, alternative argument to protect
the General Counsel's decisions from attack.6 9
B. Substantially Justified v. Reasonableness
When the substantial justification standard is compared with the General
Counsel's discretion to issue a complaint based on a finding of reasonable
cause, it becomes clear that the General Counsel's standard is lower, and
therefore more vulnerable, to EAJA attacks. First, the Board's current
Rules and Regulations on EAJA actually contain a reasonableness standard
require a showing that the General Counsel's position was substantially jus-
tified. Section 102.144(a) provides that the applicant will receive fees unless
the position of the General Counsel was substantially justified. The Regula-
tions place the burden of proof on the General Counsel to demonstrate that
her position in the proceeding was "reasonable in law and fact."7 Thus, the
Board rules actually equate substantially justified with reasonable. However,
in the 1985 amendments to the EAJA, Congress clearly indicated that mere
reasonableness was not sufficient to protect the agency from an EAJA
attack. 7 '
Second, if the General Counsel's Regional Director has any doubt as to
the merits of a charge, the complaint should be issued.72 The "doubt" stan-
67. See, e.g., Temp Tech Indus. v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1985); Iowa Express
Distrib. v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1984); Tajon, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 13,
1986); East Tenn. Packing Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 168 (Dec. 31, 1985); Rapid Rental, Inc., 277
N.L.R.B. No. 129 (Dec. 19, 1985); Phil Smidt & Son, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (Sept. 30,
1985); DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 300 (1984); Derickson Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 516
(1984).
68. In any event, if the General Counsel's decision to issue a complaint is to remain an
independent one, it is preferable to have this decision immune from financial attack. As noted
earlier, the issuance of a complaint is the starting point of litigation. A complaint states only
that there is a reasonable basis for an unfair labor practice charge. By making the issuance of a
complaint subject to EAJA claims, Congress has restricted the "free exchange of ideas and
positions within each agency that is essential for good government." Equal Access
Reauthorization Pocket Vetoed by President, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2964 (1984).
69. President Reagan has also maintained that such a broad definition of "position"
would "inhibit free discussion within an agency prior to any final agency policy decision or
action for fear that any internal disagreements or reservations would be the subject of discov-
ery and judicial inquiry." Id. Nevertheless, the Board and the courts have permitted EAJA
attacks on the underlying basis of the issuance of a complaint and therefore the General Coun-
sel is required to demonstrate in such cases that its position was substantially justified. Id.
70. 29 C.F.R. § 102.144(a) (1985).
71. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
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dard is also significantly lower than substantially justified. Consequently, in
"borderline" cases, the General Counsel will be less likely to issue a com-
plaint, fearing liability because the charge did not meet the substantially jus-
tified standard. This fear could impact upon the General Counsel's
traditional, unreviewable discretion to issue a complaint, and therefore
"chill" government enforcement of the NLRA.7 3
C. Other Factors: EAJA Review by the Board and Courts
The General Counsel's actions under the EAJA are reviewed by the Board
and the federal courts. 74 The Board, usually through an administrative law
judge, decides whether attorney's fees will be awarded. 75 The review factor
may influence the General Counsel to issue complaints only when she be-
lieves that the Board would also issue a complaint on the same facts.76
Clearly, this contravenes the 1947 LMRA amendments which attempted to
make the General Counsel independent from the Board on the issuance of a
complaint.
77
The General Counsel may also feel pressured by the federal courts to con-
form to their standards for the issuance of a complaint. For example, in
Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 7s the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit held the NLRB liable for attorney's fees because the Board had
73. See Hearings on S. 265, supra note 41, at 42-44 (statement of Alice Daniel, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice) (in the face of EAJA liability, the
higher substantially justified standard will chill government enforcement of public interest stat-
utes). In a letter to the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Ray Denison, Director of the Depart-
ment of Legislation for the AFL-CIO maintained that:
Such a standard would inhibit vigorous enforcement of the regulatory laws enacted
by the Congress to protect the people of this country, not only by inducing a narrow
and overly-cautious approach by the agency lest it risk depletion of its budget
through fee awards, but by diverting agency resources and personnel into litigation of
the justifiability of the Government's position in initiating any action which is ulti-
mately unsuccessful.
Id. at 563.
74. 29 C.F.R. § 102.143(b) (1986). Review by the federal courts is discretionary. 5
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4984, 4995.
75. 29 C.F.R. § 102.148 (1986).
76. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. The General Counsel has unreviewable
discretion to issue a complaint based on a reasonable unfair labor practice charge. However,
the complaint may later be dismissed after trial. Often a charge appears to have merit and yet
it is only at trial, with the discrediting of witnesses, that the reasonable charges are dismissed.
77. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
78. 710 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1983). It should be noted that several of the cases discussed
herein arose before the 1985 amendments clarifying the standard for substantially justified.
Thus, while it is possible that the courts applied a less stringent standard than currently re-
quired, an analysis of these cases and their effect is still quite valid. The cases effectively
"chill" the General Counsel's role regardless of the standard.
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failed to follow the Eleventh Circuit's precedent on a point of law.79 At
issue was the interpretation of the term "protected concerted activities." 80
"Because the NLRB's position in the case was unreasonable under the law of
the [Eleventh Circuit]," the court maintained that the administrative law
judge and the Board "abused their discretion by dismissing Enerhaul's
[EAJA] petition."8 While the Eleventh Circuit's view not only challenges
the fact that the Board and the federal courts have historically been permit-
ted to have differences of opinion over legal issues,82 it is extremely damag-
ing to the General Counsel's traditional discretion to issue complaints free
from judicial review.83 The General Counsel would be compelled to issue
complaints only on facts with which the courts would agree. Enerhaul
forces the General Counsel to follow court of appeal precedent rather than
Board law, and therefore undermines the authority of the Board. Finally,
the General Counsel is placed in a "no-win" situation. If the Office of the
General Counsel chooses to follow Board law, the circuit court will find it
liable for EAJA fees. If the General Counsel chooses the circuit law, the
Board will find it liable. Thus, Enerhaul creates confusion with respect to
the application of EAJA awards and severely damages the General Coun-
sel's traditional, unreviewable discretion.
Despite the confusion created by the Enerhaul decision, it is interesting to
note that the Eleventh Circuit employed a reasonableness standard in that
case to determine if the Board was substantially justified. 4 The Enerhaul
court maintained that the NLRB's position was unreasonable in law.85 The
court's use of the reasonableness standard, despite its definition of substan-
79. Id.
80. Id. at 750. Both the administrative law judge and the Board upheld the General
Counsel's prima facie case, even though they dismissed the complaint which alleged that the
charging party employee had been discharged for his complaints about job conditions. The
court of appeals held that, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, individual griping and com-
plaining was not "protected concerted activity" and that, therefore, the General Counsel was
not substantially justified in issuing a complaint. Id. at 751.
81. Id. at 751. Cf Waynadotte Sav. Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1982) (hold-
ing that the NLRB was substantially justified, so as to deny attorney's fees, even though the
NLRB's position was contrary to prior Sixth Circuit precedent).
82. When the NLRB issues a final order, it must take the order to the federal courts for
enforcement. In addition, aggrieved parties may petition the courts to set aside the Board
order. Therefore, Board decisions are often subject to review by the federal courts. If the
court disagrees with the Board's interpretation of law or facts, it will not enforce the order.
The Board is not legally required to adhere to the court's view but it will have no means by
which to enforce its policy. Such "split" issues may go on for years or be taken up to the
Supreme Court for a final and binding interpretation. See Morris, supra note 10, at 1697-1725.
83. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
84. 710 F.2d at 750.
85. Id. at 751.
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tially justified, is undoubtedly the main reason that both the Board and the
courts have upheld most of the General Counsel's decisions to issue a com-
plaint when an unfair labor practice is alleged. Therefore, the traditional
enforcement of the NLRA has not yet been "chilled" by the EAJA.
IV. THE EAJA-NLRB EXPERIENCE 1980-1985: PRESERVATION OF THE
GENERAL COUNSEL'S DISCRETION
In the five years since the EAJA was enacted, prevailing parties in unfair
labor practice proceedings have frequently sued the NLRB for attorney's
fees. While in most cases the Board and the courts have found that the
General Counsel's decision to issue a complaint was substantially justified, 6
several cases have awarded fees. 7 Issuance of a complaint in cases involving
close questions of fact or credibility determinations has been consistently
upheld.88 However, questions of law have placed the General Counsel's dis-
cretion under more extensive review and attack. 9 In addition, other issues
such as whether the General Counsel must establish a prima facie case and
the use of affidavits to prove substantial justification have resulted in more
86. See, e.g., Temp Tech Indus. v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1985); Natchez Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985); Iowa Express Distrib., Inc. v.
NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1985); Wyandotte Sav. Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.
1985); Westerman, Inc. v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984); Spencer v. NLRB, 548 F. Supp.
256 (D.D.C. 1982); Tajon, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 13, 1985); Forest Grove Lumber
Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Dec. 31, 1985); Bronaugh Motor Express, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No.
169 (Dec. 31, 1985); Adams & Westlake, Ltd., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Dec. 19, 1985); Rapid
Rental, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (Dec. 19, 1985); Patrick & Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 51
(Nov. 15, 1985); Abbott House, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Oct. 31, 1985); Western Newspa-
per Pub. Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (Oct. 29, 1985); Craig & Hamilton Meat Co., 276
N.L.R.B. No. 103 (Sept. 30, 1985); Phil Smidt & Son, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 122 (Sept. 30,
1985); Stonehouse Coal Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (Sept. 30, 1985); Best Bread Co., 276
N.L.R.B. No. 145 (Sept. 30, 1985); Union Carbide Bldg. Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 160 (Sept. 30,
1985); B.J. Heating, 273 N.L.R.B. 329 (1984); Danzansky-Goldberg Memorial Chapels, Inc.,
272 N.L.R.B. 903 (1984); V.B. Fabricators, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1984); Hamel Forest
Prods., 270 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1984); Bosk Paint & Sandblast Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 514 (1984);
Derickson Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 516 (1984); Wright-Bernet, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 55 (1984);
Charles H. McCauley Assoc., 269 N.L.R.B. 791 (1984); Woodview Rehab. Center, 268
N.L.R.B. 1239 (1984).
87. See, e.g., Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing lower
court's refusal to award fees); Evergreen Lumber, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Feb. 21, 1986)
($13,489.41); Central Motors Express, Inc., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Sept. 30, 1985)
($6,001.50); DeBolt Transfer, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 300 (1984) ($6,008.18); Lion Uniform, No.
JD-76-83, (Atlanta Branch, NLRB, Sept. 13, 1983) ($187,469.10).
88. See, e.g., Temp Tech Indus. v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1985); Natchez Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985); Adams & Westlake, 277 N.L.R.B.
No. 135 (Dec. 19, 1985); Rapid Rental, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (Dec. 19, 1985); Patrick &
Co., 277 N.L.R.B. 51 (Nov. 15, 1985).
89. See, e.g., Evergreen Lumber Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Feb. 21, 1986).
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difficult questions for the Board and courts to review. 90 Generally, however,
the General Counsel's decisions have been upheld.9 '
The main reason for upholding the General Counsel's decisions is the fact
that the Board and courts have reviewed the General Counsel's position with
a reasonableness standard rather than the higher substantial justification
standard required by the EAJA. With the new 1985 amendments yet to be
applied, the General Counsel's high rate of success in warding off EAJA
attacks might decrease. However, since the Board has interpreted the 1985
amendments as merely clarifying substantially justified to mean "more than
mere reasonableness, ' 92 and has upheld several cases based on the pre-1985
standards,93 it is unclear whether the new amendments will actually impose
a more restrictive standard.
A. EAJA Attacks on Cases Involving Questions of Fact and Credibility.
Upholding the General Counsel's Discretion
The Board and courts have consistently upheld the General Counsel's de-
cisions to issue complaints where questions of fact or credibility arise as an
element of the EAJA claim. 94 The standard employed by both the Board
and the courts provides that as long as the General Counsel demonstrates
that her position was reasonable in law and fact, it was substantially justi-
fied.95 Accordingly, the Board and courts have upheld "close issues of fact"
that can only be fully resolved at trial.
The EAJA reviewers recognize the General Counsel's right to issue com-
plaints in cases in which the merits of the charge are questionable. For ex-
ample, in Rapid Rental, Inc.,9 6 the Board held that "the General Counsel
has no obligation to restrict the issuance of complaints to sure 'winners.' "97
90. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Metal Trades District Council, 271 N.L.R.B. No. 195 (1984)
(where administrative law judge awarded fees but Board noted that he failed to consider Gen-
eral Counsel's reasons for not revealing affidavits).
91. In 33 cases involving the position of the General Counsel, the Board and courts held
in 28 cases that the General Counsel was justified in issuing a complaint. See supra note 86.
92. See, e.g., Adams & Westlake, 277 N.L.R.B. No. 135, at I n.1; Tajon, Inc., 277
N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 1 n.1; East Tenn. Packing Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 168, at I n.I; Stone-
house Coal Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 140, at I n.I; Phil Smidt & Son, 276 N.L.R.B. No. 122, at I
n.l,
93. See, e.g., Patrick & Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Nov. 15, 1985); Abbott House Inc., 277
N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Oct. 31, 1985); Western Newspaper Pub. Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (Oct.
29, 1985); Best Bread Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 145 (Sept. 30, 1985).
94. See infra note 98.
95. 29 C.F.R. § 102.144 (1986).
96. 277 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (Dec. 19, 1985).
97. Id. at 3. Rapid Rental involved an alleged discriminatory discharge for union activi-
ties (§ 8(a)(3) violation), which was originally dismissed. The charging party took an adminis-
trative appeal to the Office of Appeals, which directed the issuance of a complaint.
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The case went to the Office of Appeals and the respondent in Rapid Rental
claimed that since there was a difference of opinion within the Office of the
General Counsel, an inference could be drawn that there was an unreasona-
ble basis for the complaint. The administrative law judge refused to draw
such an inference, stating that "[i]f the disagreement between the [two of-
fices] suggests anything at all, it suggests that the case in question was close
enough so that different officials charged with the administration of the
[NLRA] could reasonably disagree on its merits.""a
The Board's decision in Rapid Rental reflects the importance of issuing a
complaint when the case is "borderline." Cases such as Rapid Rental serve
to protect the General Counsel's discretion, as well as the basic principle
that it is better to issue a complaint of questionable merit than to foreclose
the opportunity of subsequent litigation.
The courts have also upheld the General Counsel's decision to issue a
complaint where the credibility and demeanor of a witness at trial cannot be
ascertained at the time a complaint is issued.99 Typically, the complaint
establishes a prima facie case that is eventually rebutted at the administrative
proceeding. Often, it is the General Counsel's witness whose demeanor is
attacked, resulting in a dismissal of the complaint."° In Adams and West-
lake, 101 the Board noted that the General Counsel was substantially justified
in issuing the complaint because the applicant's (employer's) duty to bargain
turned largely upon the facts in dispute. °2 Although the judge ultimately
credited the testimony of the employer's general manager based on his de-
meanor, the Board held that this factor alone could not establish that the
General Counsel's position was not substantially justified.'
Cases similar to Adams have demonstrated greater deference to the Gen-
eral Counsel's decision to issue a complaint when credibility issues involving
98. Id. Accord Abbott House, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Oct. 31, 1985) (holding that the
General Counsel was substantially justified in issuing a complaint where the refusal-to-bargain
case involved a close question of interpretation of a settlement stipulation); Western Newspa-
per Pub. Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (Oct. 29, 1985) (holding that the General Counsel was
substantially justified in issuing a complaint where the judge's decision turned on certain fac-
tual inferences which he was only able to draw after lengthy testimony).
99. See Temp Tech Indus. v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1985); Adams & Westlake,
277 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Dec. 19, 1985); Patrick & Co., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (Nov. 15, 1985);
Best Bread Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 145 (Sept. 30, 1985); V.B. Fabricators, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B.
1032 (1984); Bosk Paint & Sandblast Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 514 (1984); Wright-Bernet, Inc., 270
N.L.R.B. 55 (1984); Charles H. McCauley Assoc., 269 N.L.R.B. 791 (1984).
100. See, e.g., Best Bread Co., 276 N.L.R.B. No. 145 (Sept. 30, 1985).
101. 277 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Dec. 19, 1985).
102. At issue in this case was whether the employer had a good faith doubt, based on
objective evidence, that the union lacked majority status. In order to ascertain this "good faith
doubt," the credibility of the employer's general manager had to be examined. Id. at I n.l.
103. Id.
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a witness arise. For example, in Temp Tech v. NLRB, " the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that "the EAJA was not designed to test the com-
plaint-issuing discretion of the Regional Director .... [T]he fact that an
ALJ might make an adverse finding on a credibility issue does not, in and of
itself, deprive the General Counsel's position of a basis in fact."' 5 The Fifth
Circuit, concurring with the Seventh Circuit on this point in Natchez Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, '06 pointed out that it is not the duty of the Gen-
eral Counsel to determine the credibility of witnesses. The Fifth Circuit also
suggested that placing the initial fact-finding burden of credibility on the
General Counsel at the investigatory stage of the case would be a denial of
due process. ' 07 Therefore, issues that turn on witness credibility and narrow
factual disputes are virtually immune from EAJA claims. As a result, the
Board and the courts are upholding the traditional practice of issuing a com-
plaint if credibility problems arise.'
B. EAJA Attacks on Questions of Law: More Review and More Awards
The Board and the courts are more willing to find the General Counsel
unjustified in issuing a complaint when the General Counsel misinterprets
Board law. The Office of the General Counsel is afforded discretion in de-
ciding issues of fact, but it is obligated to issue complaints based upon estab-
lished Board or Supreme Court law.' 09 While the EAJA permits the
advancement of good faith "novel but credible extensions and interpreta-
tions of the law that often underlie vigorous enforcement efforts," '' the
General Counsel is not permitted to issue a complaint on a theory that has
been expressly or impliedly rejected. In Debolt Transfer, "' the administra-
tive law judge explained that a difference exists between "the General Coun-
sel's reasonable exploration of novel and close issues" and situations where
an applicant has "wholly prevailed" in the adversary adjudication." 2 In this
case, the General Counsel's position was on the "wrong side" of the line, and
the Board held that the General Counsel's position was not substantially
104. 756 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 588, 590.
106. 750 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985).
107. Id. at 1351-52.
108. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Evergreen Lumber Co., 278 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Feb. 21, 1986); DeBolt Trans-
fer, 271 N.L.R.B. 300 (1984).
110. H.R. Rip. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NI'ws 4984-85.
11I. 271 N.L.R.B. 300 (1984).
112. Id. at 303.
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justified.1 3 Thus, the Board will not protect the General Counsel when she
asserts legal theories that have no basis in Board law.
A more difficult problem arises when the Board has not yet adjudicated
certain theories of law. For example, in Evergreen Lumber Co., 114 the Board
found that the applicant was entitled to attorney's fees under the EAJA be-
cause the General Counsel's basis for issuing the complaint, while novel, was
not a "reasonable [or] credible extension or interpretation of existing
law."" 5 The administrative law judge noted that although no Board deci-
sion existed on the issue involved, the General Counsel's theory was "so
untenable that it has never been raised previously."" ' 6 The General Coun-
sel's failure to demonstrate any basis in law resulted in an EAJA award.
In contrast to the Evergreen Lumber case, the administrative law judge in
Derickson Co., 117 held that when the General Counsel advances a theory
similar to existing law, the issuance of a complaint was found to be substan-
tially justified."' The reconciliation of these two cases lies in the fact that in
Derickson, the General Counsel offered several Board cases as analogies,
whereas in Evergreen, the novel extension was not based upon any existing
Board law.' ' Therefore, while the Board and the courts will review the
General Counsel's theory of law with greater scrutiny, the General Counsel
still retains a great amount of discretion on questions of fact and "close"
questions of law.
C. Substantially Justified Is Reasonableness in Disguise
In upholding the General Counsel on close factual questions, credibility
issues, and some theories of law, the Board and the courts have equated the
substantially justified standard with reasonableness. In so doing, the Board
and the courts are basically holding the Office of the General Counsel re-
sponsible for the same reasonableness standard that it has traditionally
followed. 2o
Pre-1985 amendment cases in which fees have been awarded do not ap-
pear to have imposed the higher substantially justified standard. For exam-
ple, in Lion Uniform, 121 the administrative law judge determined that "the
113. Id.
114. 278 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Feb. 21, 1986).
115. Id. at 10.
116. Id.
117. 270 N.L.R.B. 516 (1984).
118. Id.
119. Evergreen, 278 N.L.R.B. No. 99, at 10.
120. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
121. ALJ Decision No. JD-76-83 (Atlanta Branch, NLRB, Sept. 13, 1983).
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test should be one of reasonableness whether 'the government can show that
its case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact.' ,,122 The judge then
awarded attorney's fees because "the General Counsel acted unreasonably
by ignoring [the] evidence."' 23 Thus, even when administrative law judges
have found that the General Counsel was unjustified in her actions, a reason-
ableness standard was applied.
The Board has recently commented on the new 1985 amendments, assert-
ing that Congress "did not change, but merely clarified the definition of sub-
stantially justified,"' 24 and that substantially justified simply means more
than mere reasonableness. But, by upholding several cases based on the pre-
1985 standard, the Board has, in effect, sustained the reasonableness stan-
dard that its reviewing courts have and will continue to apply. While these
phrases are interpretations of semantics, the different standards affect who
will receive EAJA awards and what standard the General Counsel is held to
in the issuance of a complaint. With the Board upholding the reasonable-
ness standard that the reviewing courts have applied for the last four years,
the General Counsel will not be inhibited in the issuance of a complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
The EAJA possessed the potential to chill the issuance of unfair labor
practice complaints. However, interpretation by both the Board and the
courts of the substantially justified standard as one of reasonableness has
protected the General Counsel's traditional, unreviewable discretion to issue
complaints. The question of whether the 1985 amendments may change the
General Counsel's protected discretion remains unanswered. The exclusion
of preliminary decisions may result in more protection if the General Coun-
sel's initial issuance decision is placed outside the jurisdiction of the EAJA.
It is more likely, however, that the more stringent requirement of substantial
justification will be placed upon the General Counsel's decision. While the
Board has not placed the "substantial justification" burden on the General
Counsel, it is too early to determine if the federal courts will enforce the
more restrictive standard. Therefore, the potential chilling effect on the
General Counsel's discretion to issue an unfair labor practice complaint may
still arise from EAJA proceedings.
Christy Concannon
122. Id. at 8.
123. Id. at 10.
124. Tajon, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at 2 (Jan. 13, 1985).
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